discoveries in that aid constitutes an unrequited transfer emerging like manna from heaven. 13 In the past, aid-receiving countries such as Zambia have seen their currencies appreciate as a result of aid inflows. Further, like resource windfalls, aid inflows have about them an aura of 'other people's money' which, like lottery winnings, as well as due to their transitory and often volatile nature, may seem easier to fritter away than one's own hard-earned incomes.
Like natural resource abundance that sometimes tends to attract the wrong sort of people to politics, foreign aid creates an encouragement to divert the aid inflow from its intended beneficiaries. This helps explain why natural resource abundance does less harm to growth in democracies with good policies than elsewhere (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) . 14 In this paper, we want to point out that during exuberant credit booms inflows of foreign credit can exert a similar manna-from-heaven effect on its recipients as resource windfalls and foreign aid, not least if the borrowing nation behaves as if there is no tomorrow and bankers revel in their role as rentiers. 15 In some cases, resource windfalls, foreign aid and rapid capital inflows tend to invite plunder with royal families, clerics, generals, politicians and bankers sitting in the driver's seat. Admati and Hellwig (2013, Ch. 9 ) describe the considerable hidden subsidies that banks deemed too big to fail (BTBFs) extract from taxpayers through implicit or explicit government guarantees. Beside explicit bailouts, these implicit bank subsidies attract generous financial contributions from bankers to politicians, encourage excessive risk taking and raise the prospect of repeated crises. Bastiat (1850) would not have been surprised:
"Sometimes the law defends plunder and participates in it. Sometimes the law places the whole apparatus of judges, police, prisons and gendarmes at the service of the plunderers, and treats the victim -when he defends himself -as a criminal… This legal plunder may be only an isolated stain among the legislative measures of the people. If so, it is best to wipe it out with a minimum of speeches and denunciations -and in spite of the uproar of the vested interests."
With its gross foreign debt rising from 100 percent of GDP in 2002 to nearly 700 percent in mid-2008, Icelandic banks, aided and abetted by the government, used the sovereign's AAA rating to attract huge private capital inflows during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] followed by a sudden 13 See Younger (1992) , Burnside and Dollar (2000) , Svensson (2000) and Djankov, Montalvo, and ReynalQuerol (2008) and also Deaton (2013, Ch. 7) . 14 Gylfason and Zoega (2003) and Goderis and Malon (2011) consider the relationship between natural resources and inequality. 15 Benigno and Fornaro (2014) use the term 'financial resource curse' to describe episodes of abundant access to foreign capital coupled with weak productivity growth.
stop and a subsequent capital outflow. 16 The inflows were accompanied and, indeed, spurred by a persistent, policy-induced appreciation of the currency intended to keep a lid on domestic inflation through a high-interest-rate policy intended also to attract foreign funds. Before and after the crash, the burden of the large foreign debt lowered the exchange rate by a half in nominal terms and a third in real terms and hence offset some of the adverse effects of the primary sector on employment, investment and output in the tradable sector. While in our earlier papers we showed how abundant natural resources (or, specifically, a heavy reliance on natural resources) had the effect of slowing down investment and growth (Gylfason and Zoega, 2006) , recent events offer an opportunity to analyze the effects of a capital outflow that offset the effects of the primary sector on the real exchange rate and on tradable output and growth. It is as if foreign creditors were awarded ownership of a part of the country's natural resources leaving a smaller part of the foreign exchange earnings for the local economy.
To underline the parallel between the inflow of natural resource rents into the Icelandic economy since the advent of the individual transferable (ITQ) quota system of fisheries management in 1991 and the inflow of foreign capital during the boom years before the crash of 2008 we submit that both types of inflow were made possible by the generosity of the government to its cronies. The inflow of the resource rent was facilitated by the government's granting vessel owners free of charge valuable common-property catch quotas the macroeconomically significant rents from which were used to invest in the fisheries, diversify into unrelated business such as banks and newspapers or pledge as collateral for bank loans.
The inflow of foreign capital was facilitated by the privatization of state-owned banks and other financial institutions during 1998-2003 which then went on an unprecedented borrowing spree abroad accumulating assets and liabilities equivalent ultimately to eight times annual GDP and the government went along aiming to create an international banking center. 17 In the typical corporatist fashion, collusion between business, banking and politics was the order of the day. The difference between the two processes, however, is that while the capital inflows were bound to be reversed, as always (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011) , there is no automatic reversal to be expected from the inflow of natural resource rents unless the quasi-privatization of the fisheries in this case leads to overfishing by vessel owners. In the natural resource 16 See Gylfason et al. (2010) , Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega (2011), Gylfason (2014) and Johnsen (2014) . 17 In the same spirit, a private company, DeCode Genetics, was in the late 1990s granted free access to public medical records to build a genetic data base to be traded on Nasdaq, but the plan generated public controversy and was not implemented. The ITQ system also generated controversy but was implemented all the same. In the next section we briefly review the recent economic history of Iceland and then go back to our earlier model of the Dutch disease to set the stage for our description of the effects of the collapse of the real exchange rate surrounding the financial crash of 2008 on the nonprimary sector, especially tourism.
Brief economic history
Iceland is unique among OECD countries in that the ratio of Iceland's exports of goods and services to GDP was stuck at about a third from 1870 (this is not a misprint) until 2008 when its economy collapsed with its three main banks whose sudden bankruptcy was, in dollar terms, among the largest corporate bankruptcies on record anywhere, a remarkable feat for a country with a population of 320,000. Why did Iceland's exports remain stagnant for so long at such a low level relative to GDP? All other OECD countries saw their exports grow more rapidly than GDP, especially after 1960 when liberalization of trade in goods and services gained momentum. For example, Denmark's export ratio rose from 32 percent in 1960 to 52 percent in 2007 while Iceland's export ratio remained stuck at about a third ( Figure 1a ).
Iceland was until 2008 a high-real-exchange-rate country, its overvalued currency holding back exports and thereby also imports except insofar as imports were financed by foreign borrowing. The systemically high real exchange rate, a condition we associate with the Dutch disease, can be traced to several causes, including high inflation 18 and an abundance of natural resources, mainly fertile fishing grounds. This link was reinforced by explicit or implicit subsidies for the fisheries, first directly from the government budget as well as through privileged access to state bank credits and then, since the mid-1980s, indirectly through gratis allocation of highly valuable and macroeconomically consequential common-property fishing rights to select vessel owners. The trendlessness of the export ratio for decades on end until 2008 seems to suggest that the change from explicit to implicit subsidization of the fisheries did not change the scope of the overvaluation of the króna. These export subsidies increased 18 Since 1960, Iceland has had the OECD region's second highest average rate of inflation, second only to Turkey. High inflation has often been seen to go along with high real exchange rates because the government hesitates to devalue the currency to keep the currency competitive, preferring foreign borrowing to make ends meet. This has been a common scenario in Africa and Latin America, for example. The fact that GDP fell by 10 percent after the crash shows that the hike in the export ratio stems mostly from a sharp increase in export earnings. Likewise, the fact that import volume contracted by 44 percent suggests a strong effect of the currency depreciation on imports on top of a much smaller income effect. Even so, the behavior of the real exchange rate of the króna before and after the crash accords well with the asset market approach to exchange rates (Branson, 1977) which predicts that (2011) and Halldorsson and Zoega (2010 Halldorsson and Zoega (2010) . 24 Gylfason et al. (2010) and Gylfason (2014) compare economic conditions in the Nordic countries during these years. 25 Source: Registers Iceland (skra.is/Markadurinn/Talnaefni). investment ( Figure 3a ) and adjusted net saving ( Figure 3b ). As defined by the World Bank (2006), adjusted net saving aims to measure the real difference between production and consumption by adjusting net saving for changes in human capital (measured by spending on education and innovation) and depreciation or depletion of natural resources (e.g., through energy or mineral depletion or overfishing). A comparison of the two panels of Figure 3 shows that, before the crash, despite Iceland's investment boom, adjusted net saving in
Iceland was far below that of Denmark even without including estimates of natural resource depletion, a controversial subject. This finding reflects Iceland's long-standing aversion to saving and correspondingly strong propensity to borrow, a common affliction among highinflation countries. The dramatic reversal of capital flows in 2008 offers us an opportunity to gauge the effects of a lower real exchange rate on the tradable sector. Because the stock of foreign debt is much higher than before, a significant part of exports must be used to service the debt. Before describing these effects we will review our model of the Dutch disease.
A prototype model
An abundance of natural resources affects secondary-sector employment, output and 
where
and r is an exogenous parameter. We then choose the value of saving r so that the external budget constraint is satisfied. 27 Thus, the higher the level of external debt D, the greater is the external surplus r required to service the debt.
Primary output is stochastic and follows a Brownian motion subject to random productivity shocks described by equation (2), and is independent of the real exchange rate; ‫ݕ݀‬
where dW represents the increment of a Wiener process ܹ݀ = ߳ ௧ ‫ݐ݀√‬ , ε having a zero mean and a unit standard deviation, i.e., ‫ܧ‬ሺܹ݀ሻ = 0 and ܸሺܹ݀ሻ = ‫.ݐ݀‬ The drift term ‫ݐ݀ߟ‬ reflects the growth of primary output while the stochastic term ߪܹ݀ represents the vicissitudes of, among other things, commodity prices that make primary output rise or fall at random, thus creating uncertainty about output in the primary sector.
Secondary-sector output is deterministic, and is an increasing function of the real exchange rate λ = p T /p N , which is defined as the price of tradable goods in terms of nontradables, ‫ݕ‬ ௧ ௌ ሺߣ ௧ ሻ, and tradable goods consumption is a decreasing function of the real exchange rate, ܿ ௧ ௌ ሺߣ ௧ ሻ. An appreciation of the currency in real terms, that is, a decrease in the relative price of tradable goods, makes λ fall.
Assuming loglinear output supply and demand functions gives ‫ݕ‬
where ߙ ଵ and ߚ ଵ are positive parameters. Combining equations (1) and (3) gives
The equation shows that an increase in primary output makes the currency appreciate in real terms and that a higher level of foreign debt -requiring a higher value of saving, rultimately raises the relative price of the tradable good, countering the effect of primary output y P on the real exchange rate.
The volatility of the primary sector also affects the real exchange rate. Using Ito's Lemma, we can write the stochastic process followed by the log of the real exchange rate as follows:
Again using Ito's lemma we can describe the evolution of the real exchange rate λ as
The drift term in the real exchange rate equation (5'), with ߠ < 0 denoting appreciation -a fall in the relative price of tradable goods -is what is usually meant by the Dutch disease.
Even so, the induced volatility of the real exchange rate described by the stochastic term may be no less important in its effect on investment for other export industries and importcompeting industries.
Turning to the tradable secondary sector, profits measured in terms of nontradables are defined as follows
where K is the stock of capital, N is employment, T denotes a fixed factor such as natural resources, land and infrastructure, e is the level of industry-wide productivity and α < 1 and β < 1. 28 The (strictly concave) function ݁ሺ‫ݓ‬ ௧ ‫ݓ‬ ௧ തതത ⁄ ሻ measures worker effort as a function of the ratio of secondary-sector wages to wages paid in the primary sector, ‫ݓ‬ ഥ. We assume the following functional form for e, invoking Solow's elasticity condition (Solow, 1979) ;
where ‫ݔ‬ = ‫ݓܾ‬ ഥ and b is a measure of the attractiveness of jobs in that sector; b < 1 suggests that jobs in the secondary sector are preferable to jobs in the primary sector.
The representative firm has to determine the optimal level of wages and employment at each point in time, w and N, and can costlessly hire or fire workers. This is given by the firstorder condition for wages and employment. The first-order condition for wages generates the following solution for secondary sector wages
so that a higher primary sector wage, a lower disutility of working in that sector and greater responsiveness of effort to relative wages as measured by κ all make secondary sector wages go up. The first-order condition for employment follows Equations (6) and (9) give short-run output supply as a function of the real exchange rate and primary sector wages holding the stock of capital fixed. Assuming that primary and secondary sector wages are initially equalized, the supply function is (6)- (10) together we find that both employment and output in the secondary sector depend on the real exchange rate, and hence on primarysector output and the level of external debt, as well as primary-sector wages. A primary-sector boom has an immediate adverse effect on output in the secondary sector by increasing the real exchange rate, an essential aspect of the Dutch disease.
28 Depreciation of capital is assumed away to simplify derivations. 29 Paldam (1994) describes the impact of the Dutch disease in Greenland through wages.
We now turn to investment. Using Ito's lemma gives us the following stochastic process
Now plugging equation (10) into the profit equation (6) gives the restricted profit function . This gives the solution:
The value of the investment option is then given by a function F(λ) which can be solved with the following Bellman equation:
The solution takes the form ‫ܨ‬ሺߣሻ = ‫ߣܣ‬ The value of the threshold depends on several variables. First, the higher the primary sector wage ‫ݓ‬ ഥ or the more attractive are primary sector jobs, as measured by b, the higher are secondary sector wages, the lower are profits in equation (12) and hence the lower the value of ߓ in equations (17) and (22), which raises the value of the real exchange threshold, making investment less likely. Second, the volatility of the real exchange rate, created by the volatility of primary output, will raise profits due to the convexity of the profit function in equation (14) and it will also lift the threshold by increasing the option value of investment through the value of the call option in equation (19) . The second effect dominates, as shown in Figure 4 , so that increased primary sector volatility raises the value of the threshold making investment less likely. This is the volatility effect emphasized in some of our previous papers. A positive trend growth of primary goods production, η, has a negative effect on the trend growth of the relative price of tradable goods θ , which raises the value of the investment threshold and makes investment in new capital less likely. Finally, an increase in the endowment of the thresholds T fixed factor T raises the value of Ω and ߓ, which lowers the value of the investment threshold so that firms start investing in new capital at a lower relative price of tradable output.
Empirical evidence
We employ a VAR to describe the relationship between the real exchange rate (E), the current account in proportion to GDP (CA), the number of tourists as a ratio of the local population (T) and non-primary exports (NP) as a share of total merchandise exports. Figure 5 shows these variables over the period 1960-2012. The upper left-hand panel shows the real exchange rate -an increase indicates depreciationand the current account surplus. There is a positive association between the two since the early 1990s when capital became mobile: a depreciation of the currency makes the current account improve, even if foreign borrowing makes the currency appreciate on impact; there is no inconsistency involved as laid out in Branson (1977) and Gylfason and Helliwell (1983) .
The upper right-hand panel shows the real exchange rate and the number of tourist arrivals The current account measures the current account surplus as a ratio to GDP. The real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of tradables.
The real exchange rate and the current account Other exports are calculated as the ratio of non-primary merchandise exports to total merchandise exports. The real exchane rate is defined as the relative price of tradables.
The real exchange rate and other exports where the latter series grows exponentially. Taking the first difference of the tourism variable generates the figure shown in the bottom left-hand corner. Looking at the last few years one can see an explosion in the number of foreign visitors in response to the lower real exchange rate. Tourism appears to respond to exchange rates with a lag. Finally, the bottom right-hand panel shows primary exports as a share of total merchandise exports. In the appendix we present unit root tests for the four series. While the real exchange rate and the current account surplus do not have a unit root, we find a unit root in the tourism variable as well as in non-primary exports. The first differences of these two variables are stationary.
We can then estimate a VAR system for the four stationary variables using annual data ranging from 1960 to 2012. The general p-th order VAR is
where ௧ ᇱ = ሺlogሺ‫ܧ‬ ௧ ሻ , ‫,ܣܥ‬ Δܶ, Δܰܲሻ, ࢼ ,..., ࢼ are matrices of parameters and ௧ a vector of error terms. The Akaike Information criterion selects two lags for the VAR, see appendix.
The results of estimating the VAR(2) are shown in Table 1 . The top entry in the second column suggests that a ten percent depreciation of the króna in real terms goes along with a (-1)) strengthening of the current account by the equivalent of 3.3 percent of GDP in the first year, and so on. The lag structure aims to forestall reverse causation. Figure 6 shows the impulse responses to a shock to the real exchange rate -that is, an increase in the relative price of tradable goods, a real depreciation. 31 The upper left-hand panel shows that the real exchange rate is stationary making it return to its initial level. The upper right-hand panel shows how higher real exchange rates improve the current account for three to four years before the effect peters out. The effect is particularly clear in the year following the depreciation of the currency. The lower left-hand panel shows the response of changes -that is, the first difference -of the number of tourist arrivals per capita. There is a positive effect that becomes significant two years after the exchange rate shock and peaks in the fourth year following the shock. This is consistent with the visual impression from Figure   5 -bottom left-hand panel -which shows that the increase in the number of tourists after the 31 The Cholesky decomposition imposes an ordering on the variables in the VAR and attributes all of the effect of any common component to the variable that comes first in the VAR system, which in our case is the real exchange rate.
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
.08
.12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of LOG(E) to LOG(E) Response of D(NP) to LOG(E) financial crash in 2008 was not instantaneous. However, we should note that the real depreciation of the currency explains only part of the increase in the number of tourists since this was on the rise even before the financial crisis and the attendant collapse of the currency.
The bottom right-hand panel in Figure 6 shows the response of the ratio of non-primary merchandise exports to total merchandise exports in first differences. This last response is weak and not significantly different from zero.
The initial impact of the real depreciation of the króna is found in the volume of imports, improving the current account in the first year after the depreciation. There follows a further positive effect on the number of foreign tourists raising export earnings. In terms of our model, tourism relies heavily on natural resources, T in the model, which may explain why it is the first sector to benefit from the low real exchange rate, see equation ( A further cause of the insignificant response of non-primary exports to the depreciation is the volatility of exchange rates and uncertainty about the future level of the exchange rate.
While more tourists can be accommodated with existing facilities, merchandise exports require investment in new capital which has not occurred due to the macroeconomic volatility, consistent with our model in the preceding section. Also, some local-cuminternational non-primary exporters keep their accounts in euro and run their operations essentially as if they were foreign firms, and are thus impervious to the exchange rate of the króna except indirectly as victims of strict capital controls deemed necessary since the crash of 2008 to protect the króna from further depreciation if domestic and foreign capital were free to leave, especially if the controls were to be removed in a disorderly fashion.
The implication appears to be that the local labor market is dual in the sense that unskilled, low-paid workers in the tourism industry suffer a more prolonged decline in their real wages following the currency collapse than the higher-skilled workers in the technology sector. The former may face more limited opportunities when it comes to leaving the country and their employers have higher profits as a result.
Before concluding, it may be worth repeating that the increase in the number of tourists relative to population has been quite sharp in Iceland, surpassing even such popular tourist destinations as France, Greece, Spain and Mauritius (Figure 7a ). The comparison with
Mauritius is especially notable for historical reasons. Until the 1980s, Mauritius was a natural resource based economy, its sugar cane industry being the country's main foreign exchange earner (Frankel, 2012) . As tourism gained momentum, however, the weight of the sugar industry in economic activity declined and the political clout of the plantation owners declined accordingly. Even so, limits imposed by the government on the expansion of tourism in Mauritius stemmed the decrease in the share of food exports in total exports (Figure 7b ). Mauritius Spain each year in Icelandic waters, there is as yet no corresponding limit on the number of tourist arrivals. This means that tourism, which already generates more foreign exchange each year than the once-dominant fishing industry, may in the years ahead permanently bypass the fishing industry as Iceland's main foreign exchange earner. Such a development may encourage the restitution of foreign exchange earnings to the domestic economy because, unlike fish exports, a significant part of tourism services is paid for on location. Further, like in Mauritius, the expansion of tourism may generate valuable externalities, including learning by doing, and result in significant political diversification away from government acquiescence to the densely concentrated fishing industry dominated by a few firms holding much of the catch quotas granted to them by the government virtually gratis toward diversified tourist-related services which, as experience from other countries shows, usually creates few political problems related to rent seeking and power concentration.
In essence, tourism is not that much different from the fisheries in that both industries exploit natural resources with attendant risks of overexploitation at public expense. The parallel is clear. Just as access to fishing grounds, a common-property resource by local law as well as by international human-rights covenants, needs to be restricted by market-friendly, nondiscriminatory methods in the interest of efficiency and fairness, access by tourists to public infrastructure as well as to natural wonders needs to be similarly regulated to forestall environmental degradation. 33 Specifically, just as catch quotas need to be sold or auctioned off on a level playing field to vessel operators wishing to exploit the common property resource at sea, with anything less than full price amounting to an implicit government subsidy, admission tickets need to be sold to tourists. 34 In early 2014, private landowners in Iceland began charging admission at Iceland's Geysir, on public land, something the government had been unwilling to do; charging admission to public property by private parties was subsequently ruled illegal by a local court. The violation was as basic as it was simple: only the rightful owner, the government on behalf of taxpayers, can levy a charge on tourists at Geysir. This basic principle has not, however, prevented the Icelandic government from creating a class of local oligarchs who have accumulated wealth and power by selling catch quotas that the government had allocated to them free of charge in a manner that the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled discriminatory in a binding decision issued in 33 Venice lost nearly two thirds of its local population before the city council decided at last, in 2011, to restrict the access of tourists to the city by levying visiting fees ('cultural donations') of up to 10 euro per hotel room per night in keeping with the user pay principle. Day trippers are exempt. 34 The government of Bhutan requires tourists to spend a minimum of $250 per day while visiting the country. As of early 2014, Dubai charges tourists a fee of up to 20 dirhams ($5) per room per night. Other examples abound.
2007
. 35 It remains to see if the government, on a smaller scale, decides to subsidize tour operators as well by not charging them for their right to sell admission to the Northern Lights (aurora borealis) and other local attractions in the public domain. 
Conclusion and discussion
We suggest that large capital inflows resemble natural resource windfalls in that both events flood the recipient country with easy money, triggering similar reactions among the natives, including general euphoria, real appreciation of the currency, reckless public policies in the belief that anything goes, rent seeking, even plunder. Akerlof and Romer (1995, p. 5 The ADF test results, where the null hypothesis is that the process contains a unit root, are as follows: 
